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STATEMENT OF CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
Appellant Mercedes Turner ("Turner") filed a Complaint stating two causes of

action against Respondent City of Lapwai ("City"): a wage claim based upon the Idaho
Wage Claim Act, I.C. §§ 4S-601 to -621, and an expense reimbursement claim
presumably based upon Idaho common law.

(R Vol. I, pp. 7-8.)

The City sought

summary judgment on both causes of action because: (1) Turner failed to file a sufficient
notice of either of her claims as required by Idaho Code §§ SO-219, 6-902(7), 6-906, and
6-907, and (2) Turner's wage claim is barred by the six-month statute oflimitations made
applicable by Idaho Code § 4S-614.
The District Court granted summary judgment on both causes of action based on
Turner's failure to file a sufficient notice of claim. (R Vol. I, pp. 119, 12S-26, 128-29.)
The District Court was not required to reach the City's alternate statute of limitations
argument regarding the wage claim. (R Vol. I, p. 119 n.l.) Turner filed a timely Notice
of Appeal. (R Vol. I, pp. 130-33.)
II.

District Court Proceedings
The City agrees with Turner's statement of "Procedural History" (Appellant's Br.

S), except that the City'S motion for summary judgment and supporting brief were filed

on July 3, 2013. (R Vol. I, pp. IS, 17.)

-S

III.

Relevant Facts
Turner was hired by the City in May 2006 as City Clerk and City Treasurer. (R

Vol. I. p. 5 ~, 5-6.) Turner's employment with the City was terminated on January 20,

2011. (R Vol. I, p. 6, 14, p. 25'4.)
Later that day, Turner submitted a check request for her alleged wages including hundreds of hours of alleged compensatory ("comp") time, sick time, and
vacation pay -

to the City's outside, private auditing firm.

(R Vol. I, pp. 67-74.).

Turner mailed a follow-up letter dated February 1, 2011 to Mayor Hernandez. (R Vol. I,

p.76.).
On February 3, 2011, the City paid Turner her last paycheck. (R Vol. I, p. 45, p.

64 , 12, p. 75.) The paycheck included the 84 hours of wages to which the City then
believed Turner was entitled, but not the hundreds of hours of alleged comp time, sick
time, and vacation pay shown on Turner's check request. (R Vol. I, p. 7, 16, p. 75.)
On February 28, 2011, Turner sent an email and letter to a single member of the
five-member City council regarding the additional comp time, vacation pay, and mileage
reimbursement she was allegedly owed. (R Vol. I, pp. 77-79.) On March 21, 2011,
Turner received a letter from Mayor Hernandez advising her that the City would notifY
her after reviewing her request for additional comp time and "other reimbursable items"
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with an outside accounting service. (R Vol. I, p. 80.) The City made no further payment
to Turner.
Turner filed her Complaint on December 21, 2012, which was 23 months after her
last day of employment with the City. (R Vol. I, pp. 4-9, p. 25

7
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4.)

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The City believes the issues on appeal are most accurately stated as follows:
1.

Is Turner's expense reimbursement claim barred for her failure to file a

claim with the City clerk as required by Idaho Code § 50-219?
2.

Is Turner's wage claim barred for her failure to file a claim with the City

clerk as required by Idaho Code § 50-219?
3.

Is Turner's wage claim barred by the statute of limitations made applicable

by Idaho Code § 45-614?

8

ARGUMENT
Turner asserts two claims in this case: one for unpaid wages, and one for
unreimbursed expenses. (R Vol. I, pp. 7-8.)1
Turner's wage claim was properly dismissed if the City is correct either that
Turner failed timely to file a sufficient claim detailing her wage claim or that her cause of
action was subject to the six-month statute of limitations made applicable by Idaho Code

§ 45-614.
Turner's expense reimbursement claim was properly dismissed if the City is
correct that Turner failed timely to file a sufficient claim detailing her reimbursement
claim.
Summary judgment was warranted on all of these grounds. The District Court's
judgment should therefore be affirmed.
I.

TURNER FAILED TO PRESENT AND FILE A "CLAIM" FOR EITHER
OF HER TWO DEMANDS.
Any person with a claim for damages against a city must file her claim "as

prescribed by chapter 9, title 6, Idaho Code."

I.e. § 50-219. SatisfYing this notice

requirement is a "mandatory condition precedent" to bringing suit. Banks v. Univ. of

1 The City denies Turner's substantive assertions regarding the nature of her employment
agreement - most particularly her claimed right to accrue hundreds of hours of comp
time payable upon termination. However, the City accepts that Turner's averments must
be taken as true for purposes of summary judgment.
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Idaho, 118 Idaho 607, 608 (1990); see also I.C. § 6-908. Turner agrees that both of her
claims are subject to this notice requirement. (R Vol. L pp. 51-52.)
Three separate statutory provisions of title 6 are particularly relevant to Turner's
two claims.
First, Idaho Code § 6-902(7) defines the word "claim" as "any written demand to
recover money damages from a governmental entity ... " I.e. § 6-902(7). The "claim"
must thus be in writing and demand money damages.
Second, Idaho Code § 6-906 provides a 180-day time limit for the filing and
requires that it "shall be presented to and filed with the clerk or secretary of the political
subdivision." I.C. § 6-906.
Third, Idaho Code § 6-907 requires that the claim contain certain elements of
information. Among other things, the claim "shall accurately describe the conduct and
circumstances which brought about the injury or damage" and the claim "shall contain
the amount of damages claimed." I.C. § 6-907.
Idaho Code § 6-907 also contains a "savings clause" that addresses certain
inaccuracies in stating the content required by that same § 6-907:
A claim filed under the provisions of this section shall not be held invalid
or insufficient by reason of an inaccuracy in stating the time, place, nature
or cause of the claim, or otherwise, unless it is shown that the governmental
entity was in fact misled to its injury thereby.
I.C. § 6-907 (emphases added).
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A.

The Savings Clause of § 6-907 Does Not Cure Deficiencies Other Than
Inaccuracies of the Content Required by § 6-907.

The gravamen of Turner's argument is that this savings clause cures many defects
relevant to Turner's various communications and shifts the burden to the City to prove
those defects were prejudicial. (Appellant's Br. 22-25.) Four points are critical to a
proper analysis of this savings clause in light of Turner's arguments.
First, the savings clause limits its curative effects only to claims "filed under the
provisions of this section" -

i.e., a "claim[] presented to and filed with a governmental

entity." I.e. § 6-907 (emphasis added).2 The savings clause does not address all writings
of any nature.

To the contrary, it presumes a "claim" has been properly "filed" in

whatever manner the statute may otherwise require. This is consistent with § 6-908's bar
on claims that are not "presented and filed within the time limits prescribed" by the
statute. See I.C. § 6-908.
Second, the savings clause addresses and excuses only non-prejudicial
inaccuracies in stating the content required by that same section, i.e., § 6-907. It does not
address or excuse omissions of the content required by § 6-907.
Third, the savings clause does not address -

much less excuse -

any other

requirement stated in another section of the statute: namely, the requirement that a claim

2 A "governmental entity," in tum, "means and includes the state and political
subdivisions" defined in § 6-902. I.C. § 6-902(3).
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be "written," I.C. § 6-902(7); that it demand "money damages," id.; that it be filed within
the 180-day time limit,

I.e. § 6-906; or that it be presented to and filed with the city clerk,

id.

Fourth. the phrase "or otherwise" read in context excuses inaccuracies in stating
the other contents required by § 6-907, such as the "conduct," "circumstances," "names,"
and "residence" also required by § 6-907 but not listed in its savings clause. See I.C. § 6907.
But the savings clause would swallow chapter 9 whole if the phrase "or otherwise"
had the effect of excusing even the requirements stated in other sections of the chapter for example, § 6-902(7)'s requirement for a "written" demand, or § 6-906's requirement
of presentment and filing upon a particular identified official within 180 days. Were the
phrase "or otherwise" accorded such sweeping meaning, the District Courts would be
compelled to conduct fact-intensive prejudice determinations resulting from orally stated
demands, or written demands sent to any government employee, or demands submitted
after 180 days.
The savings clause simply states the Legislature's policy choice that a claim shall
not be rejected "by reason of" an inaccuracy in content. See I.C. § 6-907; Smith v. City of
Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 621 (1978) (analyzing § 6-907 and noting "there was nothing in

the record to suggest that the city was 'misled to its injury' Qy any deficiencies in the
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contents of the letter" (emphases added)). The savings clause does not state that a claim
shall not be rejected "by reason of' omissions of content or failing to satisfy the
requirements of other sections of chapter 9. See I.C. § 6-907; see also I.C. § 6-908.
Thus, for example, a demand stated orally to the city clerk, within 180 days, and
containing perfect content required by § 6-907 is invalid because it is not even a "claim"
in the first place: the statute defines a "claim" as a demand that is "written." I.e. § 6902(7). The savings clause of § 6-907 and prejudice inquiries would be irrelevant. See

Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 748 (1995) (declining plaintiff's argument that
"written or oral notice may be sufficient ... as long as the State is not prejudiced by the
manner of imparting notice").
This construction does not eviscerate the statute or the savings clause. It honors a
policy choice not to deny claims for non-prejudicial content inaccuracies.

Turner's

reading of § 6-907 would eviscerate the statute by permitting broad curative effects that
will require significant discovery and litigation to resolve.

The Legislature created a

bizarrely specific statutory scheme if the entire judicial inquiry was simply intended to
be, "Was the governmental entity misled to its injury?" That is not the law in Idaho.
1.

The Savings Clause Does Not Cure Turner's Failure to Present Her
Requests to the City Clerk.

As discussed below, the City does not accept that Turner's requests, cumulatively
or otherwise, constituted a "claim," i.e., a "written demand to recover money damages."
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See I.C. § 6-902(7). But even if they were cumulatively considered a "claim," Turner has
never argued or could argue that she presented anything to the City clerk or filed
anything with the City clerk's office. See I.C. § 6-906; Appellant's Br. 16.
As demonstrated above, the savings clause of § 6-907 purports neither to address
nor to cure the requirement of § 6-906 that a claim "shall be presented to and filed with
the clerk" of the City. See I.C. §§ 6-906, 6-907. The savings clause is irrelevant to that
analysis. As discussed below, none of the cases Turner cites alters this requirement.
This alone provides a sufficient basis to affirm the District Court's dismissal of
both of Turner's claims.
2.

The Savings Clause Does Not Cure Turner's Failure to State the
Amount of Her Expense Reimbursement Claim.

Similarly, even if Turner's requests for expense reimbursement, cumulatively or
otherwise, were considered a "claim," they fail because none noted the amount of her
2010 expenses, even though they were surely within her knowledge by the time she made
her requests in 2011. (See R Vol. I, pp. 66-79.)
The Court can scour the record before it and it will not find years after Turner's termination -

over two and a half

a simple statement of the amount the City owed her

for unreimbursed expenses.
As demonstrated above, the savings clause in § 6-907 does not cure omissions of
the information required by that same section. This includes the requirement that the
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claim "shall contain the amount of damages claimed," at least where the plaintiff knows
or could calculate the amount. See I.C. § 6-907.
Again, none of the cases Turner cites alters this straightforward requirement.
Turner's failure to state the amount of her expense reimbursement claim renders that
claim invalid under § 6-907.
B.

Smith and Huff Do Not Assist Turner's Case.

As plaintiffs have done unsuccessfully for over three decades, Turner relies upon

Smith v. City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618 (1978), and Huff v. Uhl, 103 Idaho 274 (1982), for
the proposition that Turner's cumulated requests fulfilled the purposes (since not the
requirements) of Idaho Code §§ 50-219,6-902(7), 6-906, and 6-907. (See Appellant's
Br.23-25.)
This reliance, as for past plaintiffs, is misplaced, because this Court has over the
past three decades since deciding Smith and Huff repeatedly distinguished the cases and
rejected a simple inquiry into whether the purposes of the statutes were met and whether
the governmental entity was, per § 6-907, "misled to its injury."

See, e.g., Blass v.

County of Twin Falls, 132 Idaho 451, 452-53 (1999) (rejecting a plaintiffs reliance on
Smith even where county-owned hospital admitted it would not have conducted any
different investigation had a sufficient claim been filed); Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho
745,748 (1995) (distinguishing Huffand holding notice insufficient even where the State

l5

was on actual notice of claim within one week of accident, conducted a full investigation,
and was not prejudiced by the insufficient notice); Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth.. 126
Idaho 484, 487 (1994) (distinguishing Smith and HufJ and holding that written notice to
city's insurer and oral statements to city representative were insufficient); Stevens v.

Fleming, 116 Idaho 523, 531 (1989) (distinguishing Smith and HufJ and holding that
letter apprising city of insurance claim made directly by plaintiffs was insufficient
because letter to city was not sent by plaintiffs themselves).
Turner is thus incorrect to argue that "Idaho courts have consistently applied a
'substance over form' analysis to tort notices." (Appellant's Br. 23.) Turner claims this
by simply disregarding this Court's cases consistently distinguishing and limiting Smith
and Huff.
Regardless, Smith and HufJare just as easily distinguished here because, in each of
those cases, notice was provided directly to "the clerk or secretary of the political
subdivision" as required by § 6-906. In Smith, the plaintiff's complaint averred (and
evidence demonstrated) that the plaintiff's letter was sent to the city clerk. See Smith, 99
Idaho at 619.
In Huff, the Court specifically noted that the secretary of the political subdivision,
I.e., the irrigation district, personally received notice of the claim in the plaintiff's
presence, when the receptionist discussed it with the secretary and kept photocopies for
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the secretary's office.

See Huff, 103 Idaho at 275, 276-77.

Contrary to Turner's

argument, it is irrelevant that the claim was initially handed to a receptionist (see
Appellant's Br. 17-19), because it was presented to and filed with the office of the
official identified in the statue.
Since deciding Smith and Huff, the Court has not relented on this statutory
requirement of § 6-906. In both Avila, 126 Idaho at 748, and Friel, 126 Idaho at 486, the
Court rejected the Court of Appeals' holding in Sysco Intermountain Food Service v. City

of Twin Falls, 109 Idaho 88 (Ct. App. 1985), that notice to a City's insurer could
substitute for notice to the officer designated in § 6-906. See also Blass, 132 Idaho at 453
(notice to insurance adjuster and forwarded to proper official at hospital still not
sufficient).

Smith, Huff, Friel, Avila, and Blass are all consistent: notice to persons other than
the official named in § 6-906 is not notice at all, and so inquiries about prejudice,
inaccuracy, substantial compliance, or otherwise are irrelevant. Cf Stevens, 116 Idaho at
531 ("Since the City had no actual notice, whether or not it was misled to its injury by
failure to provide formal notice is irrelevant. ").

Turner has never asserted that she

presented and filed anything with the City clerk.
Similarly, in both Smith and Huff the amount of damages claimed was included as
required by § 6-907, or the damages were specifically stated to be unknown but
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forthcoming. See Huff, 103 Idaho at 276 (noting amount presented to secretary); Smith,

99 Idaho at 621 (noting "subrogation claim will be presented as soon as we have the total
damages completed").
Turner asserts that the amount of her claim was plain from the paycheck request
she faxed to the outside, private auditor's office 16 miles outside the City. (Appellant's
Br. 11; R Vol. I, pp. 66-67.) But the paycheck request and fax nowhere stated the
amount of Turner's unreimbursed expenses. (See R Vol. I, pp. 66-73.) Neither did
Turner's letter to the mayor or her email or her letter to a single City councilor, sent over
the subsequent months. (See R Vol. I, pp. 76-79.) This omission is not saved by § 6907, Smith, Huff, or any other Idaho law.
The above facts and authority are sufficient to resolve this case and affirm the
District Court. But Turner asserts other arguments that require response.

C.

Turner's "Officials of Greater Rank" Are Irrelevant and Were Not
Empowered as Turner Assumes.

Turner argues that it is sufficient that "officials of greater rank and authority" with
the presumed "authority to pay [Turner's] claim" were presented Turner's requests.
(Appellant's Br. 16.) This argument is incorrect for several reasons.
First, it incorrectly assumes the mayor and a single City councilor out of five City
councilors had the authority to pay tens of thousands of dollars in wages to a terminated
employee. This is perhaps self-evidently incorrect. The five-member City council had
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that authority. Turner has provided no evidence that any other City council member
received any of Turner's requests.
Turner's false assumption reveals the danger of accepting her novel argument and
driving a hole through § 6-906's requirement of presentment upon the clerk or secretary
of a political subdivision.

The District Courts would be tasked with fact-intensive

determinations regarding which "officials of greater rank and authority" in a given case
are better suited to receive notices of claims than the officials designated by the
Legislature. Turner's argument is incorrect substantively councilor were not so empowered -

the mayor and single City

and it is misguided as a policy matter.

Second, in advancing this argument, Turner overplays the significance of the
receptionist in Huffhaving been handed the notice of claim. (Appellant's Br. 17.) It did
not matter who literally was the first to touch it, because that person immediately turned
and advised the official authorized by statute of the claim and kept photocopies for that
official's office. See Huff, 103 Idaho at 275,276-77. That is why this Court wondered
what more the plaintiff could have done by way of presentment. See id. at 277. Was he
to have asked for it back and handed it to the irrigation district secretary himself?
But it was also irrelevant whether the secretary of the irrigation district was
empowered to pay the claim. That is not the analysis contemplated by the statute or Huff.
Turner falsely assumes that delivery to the mayor of a city

-19

the purported decision

maker -

is the Legislature's ultimate goal. A straightforward example proves that is

unfounded: if Turner had presented a notice of claim to the City clerk, that clerk could
have turned and handed it to a summer intern with absolutely no power whatsoever and the City still would have been properly noticed and bound by the Clerk's action.
It is irrelevant for purposes of § 6-906 to whom the City clerk transfers a notice of

claim or whether they are empowered to pay it. It is only relevant that the notice be
presented to and filed with the City clerk. Turner's arguments to the contrary are red
herrings and analytically misleading.

D.

Cumulative Writings and Actual Notice Do Not Constitute a "Claim."

Turner asserts that three requests, if taken "cumulatively," satisfy the statutory
content requirements for damages claims set forth in Idaho Code § 6-907. (Appellant's
Br. 8, 21.) Turner provides no authority for the proposition that a plaintiff can cumulate
several written requests to different parties to meet the obligation to present and file with
the proper official a single, sufficient "claim" for "money damages." See I.C. § 6-902(7).
The Court should not accept Turner's invitation to make new law on this point.
First, § 6-902(7) defines the word "claim" as "any written demand to recover
money damages from a governmental entity ... " I.C. § 6-902(7). The word "demand" is
in the singular. The statute, read in context, addresses the requirements for a single,
written demand -

and that demand stands or falls on its own as a "claim."
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The demand may not have to be in a particular form, but it must satisfy certain
statutory requirements, such as the presentment and filing requirement of § 6-906. Htif[
illustrates this perfectly: as informal as Mr. Huffs "demand" may have seemed, it was
timely presented to the correct official's office, it was written, it detailed an amount of
damages, and it contained no prejudicial inaccuracy. See Huff, 103 Idaho at 275-77.

For this Court to permit Turner's notice by cumulated writings - none of which is
even presented to or filed with the proper official the statute and this Court's case law.

would be a dramatic departure from

The entire statutory design and purpose of

channeling the required content to a single identified official of each governmental entity
would be destroyed.

Instead, every governmental entity would be charged with the

knowledge of every writing received by any of its employees that may with other writings received by other employees -

taken together

cumulatively meet the elements of a

claim. Such a rule would be absurd.
This is why Judge Winmill held correctly in Brown v. City of Caldwell, 769 F.
Supp. 2d 1256 (D. Idaho 2011), that successive "demand letters" did not constitute notice
of a "claim[] for damages" under § 50-219. See id. at 1258-59, 1263. The successive
demand letters in Brown, like Turner's successive requests, were in some respects
extensive. (See R Vol. I, pp. 88-101 (copies of relevant demand letters from Brown's
Pacer record).) It is hard to imagine the City of Caldwell arguing that it was not on actual

21

notice of Mr. Brown's demands -

even if they were sent to the fire chief instead of the

city clerk, as Turner argues. (See Appellant's Br. 18-19.)
But actual notice and lack of prejudice are not the beginning and end of the
analysis, as Turner wishes they were. This Court has repeatedly noted that a "claim," as
defined in § 6-902(7), is intended to place the governmental entity on formal notice that
an aggrieved person "intended to go a step farther by bringing a tort claim." Pounds v.

Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 427 (1991); accord Avila, 126 Idaho at 748 (quoting this
passage from Pounds and holding notice insufficient where it did not state amount of
claim or provide notice that plaintiff "was pursuing a tort claim").
This Court explained this statutory purpose even in Smith:
[T]he government's actual notice of the injury did not obviate the need to
satisfy those notice requirements. Mere knowledge of the injury does not
necessarily put the governmental entity on notice that a claim against it is
being prosecuted and thus apprise it of the need to preserve evidence and
perhaps prepare a defense.

Smith, 99 Idaho at 621; see also Stevens, 116 Idaho at 530.
Turner's case is similar to the aggrieved employee

In

Pounds.

Ms. Pounds

endured an entire formal grievance process with the state university, which involved
cumulative writings, hearings, and appeals, which plainly put the university on actual
notice of her asserted injury:
Pounds argues that she substantially complied with the notice requirement,
and that the respondents received adequate notice of her claim, by the filing
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of her grievance, the grievance hearing, and the appeal to the Personnel
Commission, all of which occurred within 120 days of her last day of work.

Pounds, 120 Idaho at 427.
This Court nonetheless held that Ms. Pounds did not substantially comply with the
statutory requirement to file a "claim," as defined in § 6-902(7):
Pounds' filing of her grievance did not provide adequate notice of a tort
claim against the respondents. It provided notice that she had a grievance,
but did not provide notice that she intended to go a step farther by bringing
a tort claim.

Id.
Turner insists that no "magic words" in Idaho law required Turner to put the City
on notice of her claim once her informal requests went unsatisfied. (Appellant's Br. 1215.) This is incorrect. First, the above Supreme Court cases supply the "magic words."
And, second, the definition of "claim" in § 6-902(7) as a "written demand to recover
money damages" supplies the "magic words." I.C. § 6-902(7) (emphasis added).
Black's Law Dictionary defines "damages" as "[m]oney claimed by, or ordered to
be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injury." Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.
2009) (emphasis added).

Only when one's requests for wages and out-of-pocket

expenses are denied or not timely paid does one have a claim for the "loss" or "injury"
resulting from the refusal to pay.

This Court's reasoning in the cases above simply
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implements the statutory text defining a "claim" as a "demand to recover money
damages." See I.C. § 6-902(7).
The District Court was thus correct: Once Turner's personal requests went
unsatisfied, Turner was obligated to put the City clerk on formal notice that she asserted a
statutory claim against the City for unpaid (not to mention, trebled) wages and a breach
of contract claim for expense reimbursements. Instead, she did nothing for nearly two
years and then filed a lawsuit.
E.

Turner's Element-by-Element Presentation Obscures the Analysis of
Her Requests and Her Two Distinct Claims.

Turner must cumulate her requests, of course, because none of her requests by
itself meets the statutory requirements for either of her two claims. The best illustration
of this is that Turner's opening brief proceeds element by element to argue that each
element of sufficient notice was met by at least one of her cumulated requests. (See
Appellant's Br. 10-21.) This allows Turner to obscure the fact that each element must be
satisfied for each of her two claims.
For example, Turner's approach obscures the fact that, as already noted, nowhere
in the record will the Court find the amount of Turner's expense reimbursement claim. It
also obscures the fact that her first "request" -

her faxed check request -

was not

presented to any City representative at all, but to an outside private auditing firm in
Lewiston, which is 16 miles away. (See R Vol. 1, p. 67.)
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For at least these reasons, the Court should consider in turn each of Turner's
proffered writings to determine if any (1) demanded "money damages" in writing, I.C.

§ 6-902(7); (2) was presented to and filed with the City clerk, I.C. § 6-906, (3) contained
the content (even if non-prejudicially inaccurate, but not if outright omitted) required by

§ 6-907, and (4) put the City "on notice that a claim against it [was] being prosecuted,"

Stevens, 116 Idaho at 530. None does.
l.

First -

Turner's Check Request Is Not a "Claim."
in support of her wage claim only -

Turner asserts she "submitted a

check request" on January 20, 2011 showing the amount of her wage request.
(Appellant's Br. 7.)

This check request, however, was sent from Turner's office on

Turner's City letterhead to a person named "Kim," an employee of the City's outside,
private auditing firm, Jergens & Co., in Lewiston, Idaho, which is 16 miles away from
Lapwai. (R Vol. I, p. 67 (listing recipient's 746- prefix).)
Turner wishes this Court to consider this check request as part of her cumulated
requests, because it contains wage amounts, her residence address, and other required
content. (Appellant's Br. 11,20-21.) The fax was sent on January 20, 2011, on Turner's
last day of work. (R Vol. I, p. 25

~

4, p. 67.) It could not have provided notice of a

"claim" for "damages," I.C. § 6-902(7), because Turner had no "damages," i.e., no "loss"
or "injury." See Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (definition of "damages").
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Turner had suffered no legal loss or injury on her last day of employment.
Nobody had denied her anything. Similarly, an employee who submits her timesheet for
signature at the end of a pay period has no "damages" for the wages then due, because
she has suffered no loss or injury until she is refused timely payment as required by law.
Turner submitted a draft paycheck. It omits material content required by § 6-907.
It does not describe any injury, the names of any persons who promised her such

exceptional wages, or the circumstances justifying her right to the demanded amounts.

See I.C. § 6-907.
Turner provided no evidence that this fax was ever shared with the City clerk. The
fax to the outside, private auditor is entitled to no weight, and the Court should not
consider it, cumulatively or otherwise.
2.

Turner's Letter to the Mayor Is Not a "Claim."

Second, in support of both her wage and expense reimbursement claims, Turner
asserts she mailed a letter dated February 1,2011 to Mayor Hernandez. (R Vol. I, p. 76.)
Turner provides no evidence that the letter was shared with the City clerk.
The letter does not contain the amount of either of her claims. (R Vol. I, p. 76.) It
does not contain her address, residential or otherwise.

(R Vol. I, p. 76.) The letter

discusses retrieving her personal property and asks vaguely about her final paycheck. (R
Vol. I, p. 76.)
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There is not a scintilla of useful information about the paycheck's amount, the
wage elements constituting it, justification for (or even a description of any alleged
agreement supporting) its outlandish amount, the names of persons involved -

nothing.

(R Vol. I, p. 76.) Turner simply provides instructions for deductions. (R Vol. I, p. 76.)
She vaguely mentions a mileage check without noting its amount or the
circumstances behind the accrual of mileage. (R Vol. I, p. 76.) She asks for January
2011 mileage to be calculated for her based on the City's bank records (R Vol. I, p. 76),
instead of (as one might expect) her own mileage records.
The letter to the mayor was not presented to the City clerk, and it omits material
content required by § 6-907. It is entitled to no weight.
3.

Turner's Letter to One of Five City Councilors Is Not a "Claim."

Third, Turner sent an email and an attached letter to a single member of the fivemember City council. (R Vol. I, pp. 77-79.) The letter provides some elaboration but
nowhere provides the amount of either of her claims. (R Vol. I, pp. 77-79.) It does not
contain any address, much less her residence. (R Vol. I, pp. 77-79.)
It does not explain the justification or agreement upon which she bases her claim

to be paid 1,500 hours of comp time and vacation on top of her salary. (R Vol. I, pp. 77-

79.) Indeed, all of Turner's requests, like the record, are bare of any Council meeting
minutes or other Council-approved agreement supporting Turner's alleged comp time and
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vacation arrangement. She requests payment of vacation and comp time pay, but not sick
leave pay. (R Vol. 1, p. 78
expenses. (R Vol. I, p. 78

~

~

4.) She requests mileage reimbursement but not other

1.)

Turner provides no evidence that her email or letter was relayed to the City clerk.
To the contrary, Councilor Smith replied to Turner and specifically advised her to take
her mileage and payroll requests -

i.e., for all items except her request for payment of

her legal bills - to '"the office," meaning the City clerk's office:
I can check on #3, but I think the other request on [sic] this letter would be
better served by the office. They have access to Cassel [payroll system]
and files that you are making reference to. The City has had temporary
people filling positions, although very competent, they are still getting a
feel for where things are and how things flow. This information may assist
them in their efforts to respond to your request.
(R Vol. I, p. 85.)
Councilor Smith did not offer to relay the e-mail message or letter to fellow City
council members, the mayor, or the City clerk (R Vol. I, p. 85), and Turner offers no
evidence that he did so. Rather, Turner was effectively placed on notice that she needed
to take her mileage and payroll claims to the City clerk. She never did.
4.

Turner's Letter From the Mayor Proves Actual Notice, Nothing
More.

Lastly, Turner asserts that she received a letter from Mayor Ricky Hernandez
advising her that the City would notify her after it reviewed her request with an outside
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accounting service. (R Vol. I, p. 80.) But not even this letter, which is not on City
letterhead, makes clear exactly what Turner requested or what amounts were at issue. (R
Vol. I, p. 80.) The letter references comp time, but not vacation or sick leave; and it
mentions "other reimbursable items," but does not indicate that the City knew what items
or amounts were subject to reimbursement.
reference or deny a request -

(R Vol. I, p. 80.)

The letter does not

much less a "claim" for "money damages" -

filed on a

given date with anyone. (R Vol. I, p. 80.)
In any event, as Smith, Pounds, Stevens, and Avila illustrate, the City's actual
notice of Turner's request for payment of wages and expenses did not relieve Turner of
the statutory requirement to provide the City clerk notice that she intended to further
pursue her requests by a cause of action for damages.

After Mayor Hernandez

presumably failed to follow up within 30 days, Turner had an obligation to present the
City clerk -

to the exclusion of the rest of the world -

with a "written demand" for

"money damages" for unpaid wages under the Wage Claim Act and for breach of a
contract to reimburse expenses.

See I.C. §§ 6-902(7), 6-906.

Such a claim, to be

complete, should have apprised the City of the amounts of her claims and the circumstances or agreements that might possibly have justified her claim to damages for payment of
1,500 hours of comp time and vacation far exceeding all limits made applicable by City
policy, enforced in annual audits by the City's auditors, and disregarded by Turner.

- 29

Turner did not do this. Turner's claims were properly dismissed by the District
Court. This Court should therefore affirm the District Court's judgment.

II.

TURNER'S WAGE CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
Wage claims in Idaho are subject either to a two-year or six-month limitations

period:
Any person shall have the right to collect wages, penalties and liquidated
damages provided by any law or pursuant to a contract of employment, but
any action thereon shall be filed either with the department or commenced
in a court of competent jurisdiction within two (2) years after the cause of
action accrued, provided, however, that in the event salary or wages have
been paid to any employee and such employee claims additional salary,
wages, penalties or liquidated damages, because of work done or services
performed during his employment for the pay period covered by said
payment, any action therefor shall be commenced within six (6) months
from the accrual of the cause of action. . .. In the event an action is not
commenced as herein provided, any remedy on the cause of action shall be
forever barred.

I.e.

§ 45-614.
The two-year limitations period applies to claims for amounts that do not relate to

and accrue in particular pay periods, such as severance pay, annual bonuses, or payments
"on account."

See, e.g., Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363, 367 (1984)

(severance pay); Thomas v. Ballou-Latimer Drug Co., 92 Idaho 337,342 (1968) (bonus);

Anderson v. Lee, 86 Idaho 300, 303-04 (1963) (payments "on account" not attributable to
particular pay periods).
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A six-month limitations period applies where, as in this case, an employee claims
additional amounts for wages for pay periods for which she has already received some
payment. See, e.g., Callenders, Inc. v. Beckman, 120 Idaho 169, 174 (Ct. App. 1991)
(additional partnership salary); see also, e.g., Wood v. Kinetic Sys., Inc., 766 F. Supp. 2d
1080, 1085-86 (D. Idaho 2011 ) (overtime and "accrued vacation pay" not paid at
termination); Long v. Idaho Rural Water Ass 'n, No. CV-05-303-S-EJL, 2007 WL
1366534, at *8 (D. Idaho Mar. 29, 2007) (training fees for trainings provided on specific
dates); Smith v. Micron Elecs., Inc., No. CV-01-244-S-BLW, 2005 WL 5328543, at * 6
(D. Idaho Feb. 4, 2005) (unpaid overtime).

A.

Turner's Claim is Subject to a Six-Month Statute of Limitations.

Wood is directly on point with this case and faithful to this Court's application of

§ 45-614. The employer in Wood paid the plaintiff amounts it believed he was owed
upon his termination.

Wood, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1083.

Just like Turner here, the

employee in Wood believed he was owed additional amounts for "accrued" and "unpaid"
vacation pay and overtime. Id. He was terminated on January 20, 2009; paid his final
paycheck on January 22, 2009; and filed a lawsuit nearly 10 months later on October 8,
2009. Id. The Court granted the employer summary judgment, id. at 1087, because the

plaintiffs claim was for "additional" wages for pay periods for which he had already
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received payment and thus was subject to the six-month limitations period, id. at 108586.
Turner's case is materially identical. The below facts demonstrate beyond dispute
that: Turner received payment for each pay period in which she alleges she accrued
vacation, sick pay, and comp time; those amounts accrued in particular pay periods; and
the allegedly accrued amounts became due upon her termination, when she had the legal
right to be paid any accrued wages.
It is undisputed that the City paid Turner her salary and wages for each pay period

throughout her employment. (See R Vol. I, p. 25

~

6, pp. 27-41.) Turner's paystubs

reflected the periodic accrual, use, and balance of the alleged wages she now seeks. (See,

e.g., R Vol. I, pp. 45, 47.) Turner's own affidavit admits that her alleged comp time was
accrued and payable for hours she allegedly worked "during each pay period." (R Vol. I,
p. 63

~

6; see also id.

~

5 (alleged comp time was earned for excess hours worked "during

a given work week").) Turner thus accumulated her alleged wages in discrete, calculable
amounts in each pay period over the course of her employment.

See I.C. § 45-614

(referring to "pay peri od[ s]").
Turner admits that the City paid her for all the "wages due and owing" the City
believed were owed through the end of her employment. (R Vol. I, p. 7 ~ 16.) Her claim
is for "accrued" and unpaid comp time, vacation, and sick leave. (See R Vol. L p. 7
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19-20.) She admits that these amounts are additional to wages she was already paid,

i.e., "the remainder of her due and owing wages." (R Vol. I, p. 7,-r 16 (emphasis added).)
In both Wood and Callenders, the Court noted that the plaintiff had pled "additional"
wages. See Wood, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1085; Callenders, 120 Idaho at 174. A plea for
"remaining" wages is a plea for "additional" wages.
Thus, in the words of the statute, "salary or wages have been paid to [Turner],"
and she claims "additional ... wages" due to her "because of work done or services
performed during [her] employment" for "pay period[ s] covered by said payment." See

I.e. § 45-614. Therefore, Turner had only six months to file her action for unpaid wages.
Turner's cause of action accrued no later than January 20, 2011, her last day of
employment with the City. See Wood, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1085-86. The limitations
period expired no later than July 20, 201l. She filed the present action on December 21,
2012. (R Vol. I, p. 4.) Her wage claim is thus untimely and should be dismissed as a
matter oflaw.
B.

Accrual of Wages Is Distinct From Accrual of a Cause of Action.

In briefing and argument in the District Court, Turner misdirected the above
analysis by repeatedly conflating accrual (or accumulation) of wages in each pay period
over the course of employment with accrual of a cause of action for payment of those
accrued wages upon termination of employment. (R Vol. I, pp. 56-60.) By insisting on
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this conflation, Turner setup the following straw man argument she attributed to the City,
but which the City did not and does not make: namely, Turner argued that the City's
reading of the statute resulted in a new claim accruing and a new, six-month clock
starting at the end of each of Turner's pay periods, which claim then expired six months
later even while Turner was still employed. (R Vol. I, p. 57.)
Turner's argument misapprehends the law and the City's analysis. Both parties
agree that Turner's cause of action -

even for alleged wages accumulated years before

accrued on her last day of employment, January 20, 2011, when she had a legal

entitlement to be paid any wages that allegedly (1) had accumulated in each pay period
over the course of her employment but (2) were not payable in cash until her termination.
But there is also no genuine dispute that Turner seeks additional compensation that
accumulated in pay periods for which she already received paychecks. Given these facts,
Turner's cause of action is subject to a six-month limitations period under § 45-614.
Several cases confirm that accrual of the cause of action is a separate inquiry from
which statute of limitations applies under § 45-614. For example, a Ninth Circuit panel
had to clarify confusion similar to Turner's in its unpublished opinion in Leher v.

Western States Equipment Co., 908 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1990):
Although Leher may not have been entitled to the commission until April
or May of 1987 ... this does not affect the applicable statute of limitations,
but rather, the datc of the accrual of the action.
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Id.
The Court of Appeals in Callenders summarized the two distinct concepts
applicable in this case perfectly:
[An] action to collect ... wages must be commenced within six months
after the cause of action accrues if the claim is for wages additional to those
already paid. I.C. § 45-614. A cause of action for the collection of wages
accrues when an employee has a right to collect the wages that are allegedly
owed to him.
Calie nders, 120 Idaho at 173-74.
In briefing before the District Court, Turner cited two cases that do nothing more
than confirm the City's position that Turner's cause of action accrued upon her
termination. In Gilbert v. Moore, 108 Idaho 165 (1985), the plaintiff filed suit two weeks
after his termination. Id. at 166-67. As Gilbert noted, 'The crucial issue is determining
when Mr. Gilbert's cause of action accrued." Id. at 167. Because Gilbert's cause of
action did not accrue until he was terminated, i.e., two weeks before Gilbert filed suit, the
Court did not even address which statute of limitations applied. See id. at 167-68.
Similarly, in Schoonover v. Bonner County, 113 Idaho 916 (1988), the plaintiff
had accumulated overtime that was payable upon his termination. Id. at 919. He filed
suit to recover his accumulated overtime "within one month of [his] termination." Id. at
918.
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These cases simply support a point on which all parties agree: Turner's cause of
action accrued upon her termination from employment.

Neither case assists Turner,

because in neither case did the plaintiff wait more than six months to file his lawsuit. See
id.; Gilbert, 108 Idaho at 166-67.

Turner's specious argument cannot stand in the way of the straightforward
analysis of § 45-614 that follows from Turner's own pleadings and affidavit.

C.

Public Policy Does Not Support Application ora Two-Year Limitations
Period.

In the District Court, Turner appealed to public policy in support of application of
a two-year limitations period. (R Vol. I, p. 60.) No liberality of construction or public
policy remotely approves a claimant like Turner her claim

fully apprised of all facts necessary to

to send several informal requests for payment of wages and then sit on her

claim for another 22 months.
Indeed, Turner's own evidence indicates that by at least February 28, 2011, when
she sent her letter to Councilor Smith, she knew court action may be necessary, she was
represented by an attorney, and she had researched some law relevant to wage claims:
(1) her email expresses her wish not "to defend myself over this letter in court some day"
(R Vol. I, p. 77); (2) her letter specifically references "my attorney" (R Vol. I, p. 78

~

3);

and (3) her letter references her "claim with the US Department of Labor" and her belief
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that "the law allows 48 hours" for an employer to pay demanded wages (R Vol. I, p. 78
~

4).

Especially in light of these facts, public policy counsels against a liberal reading of
the statute of limitations in this case, not for it. Turner provides no evidence justifying a
22-month delay in filing her wage action.
Regardless, as the cases demonstrate, there is no relevant ambiguity in the statute
that justifies application of policy considerations or a two-year limitations period.

Wood is directly on point with Turner's case and its analysis is consistent with this
Court's case law. See Wood, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1085-86. Ultimately, Turner's own
testimony in opposition to summary judgment (R Vol. I, p. 63

~~

5-6, p. 64

with her Complaint's request for "remain[ing]" wages (R Vol. I, p. 7

~

16) -

~

12) -

as

plead her

squarely into the six-month limitations period made applicable by § 45-614. Her wage
claim is barred because she filed it well more than six months past January 20, 2011.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the District Court's entry of
judgment in favor of the City on all of Tumer's claims.
DATED this 15th day of April, 2014.
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